Eldridge-Smith, Peter (2019) The Liar Hypodox: A Truth-Teller’s Guide to Defusing Proofs of the Liar Paradox. Open Journal of Philosophy, 09 (02). pp. 152-171. ISSN 2163-9434
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Abstract
It seems that the Truth-teller is either true or false, but there is no accepted principle determining which it is. From this point of view, the Truth-teller is a hypodox. A hypodox is a conundrum like a paradox, but consistent. Sometimes, accepting an additional principle will convert a hypodox into a paradox. Conversely, in some cases, retracting or restricting a principle will convert a paradox to a hypodox. This last point suggests a new method of avoiding inconsistency. This article provides a significant example. The Liar paradox can be defused to a hypodox by relatively minimally restricting three principles: the T-schema, substitution of identicals and universal instantiation. These restrictions are not arbitrary. For each, I identify the source of a contradiction given some presumptions. Then I propose each restriction as a reasonable way to deal with that source of contradiction.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | Open Archive Press > Social Sciences and Humanities |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email support@openarchivepress.com |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jul 2023 04:09 |
Last Modified: | 23 Apr 2024 12:05 |
URI: | http://library.2pressrelease.co.in/id/eprint/1669 |